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BORDERS OR HORIZONS? GADAMER AND HABERMAS
REVISITED
FRED R. DALLMAYR*

INTRODUCTION

What is the status of borders, boundaries, or demarcations? Do
borders mandate separation and exclusion, or are they more like
hyphens indicating a difficult kind of collusion, a correlation without
sameness? Do they mean to keep the stranger out, or are they more
like gestures honoring and welcoming the other's strangeness? In
many ways, Western modernity is a high tide of borders and
demarcations functioning as signs of exclusion. Politically, nationstates were divided from nation-states, Catholics from Protestants,
ethnic loyalties from other ethnic loyalties-all in the name of
autonomy and rigorous self-identity. In the philosophical domain,
Ren6 Descartes drew sharp boundaries around the "thinking ego"
(ego cogitans) in an effort to keep at bay all forms of non-mental
otherness-including nature ("extended matter") and dubious
assumptions impinging on mind's autonomy. The Enlightenment
reinforced these boundaries by postulating a clear division between
light and darkness, between reason and prejudice or tradition, and
between revolution and all types of "old regimes."
The most
formidable demarcations as signs of exclusion were established by
Kant's critical philosophy, with its insistence on the contrast between
reason and sensation, between knowledge and faith, and between
moral autonomy and nature (or natural causality). In Kant's own
presentation, the reason-faith distinction was meant to grant broad
room to religious belief or fideism. However, as other thinkers
(including Hegel) noted, the same demarcation could also have the
effect of rendering faith pointless and outmoded-which was
precisely the conclusion drawn by later positivism.
There can be no doubt that boundaries-including the
boundaries of Western modernity-can have beneficial effects, by
* Packey J. Dee Professor of Government and International Studies, University of Notre
Dame.
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protecting vulnerable forms of agency. In social settings marked by
hierarchy and inequality, borders can serve as ramparts shielding the
weak against the strong, the marginalized against hegemonic elites.
Many of the achievements of modern liberal democracy-above all
individual rights and liberties-are the result of careful border
demarcations. It is equally clear, however, that borders can turn into
prison fences and possibly into bastions of (external and internal)
aggression. The latter result was dramatically demonstrated by
events during the twentieth century when exclusionary aggression
reached a climax of violence and destruction. The perils of this
outcome were not entirely lost on contemporary observers and
witnesses. At least partly in response to political events, some
European philosophers began to revise the exclusionary role of
borders-not in the direction of a "melting-pot" fusion, but of their
nuanced treatment as markers of both differentiation and contiguity.
This rethinking was evident in the motto of Husserl's
phenomenology "to the things themselves"-a motto which boldly
sought to regain access to the "thing-in-itself" (excluded by Kant) as
an open horizon of inquiry. Even more resolutely, the same
trajectory was pursued in Heidegger's philosophy, especially in his
hyphenated formulations of human existence as "being-in-the-world"
and "ek-static" openness. 2 The following pages seek to examine the
status of borders and horizons in the respective works of Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. For this purpose, the focus is placed
on the so-called Gadamer-Habermas debate initiated by the early
Habermas-a debate that has been often reviewed, but rarely from
this angle.3 While the first Part recapitulates some of Gadamer's
teachings, chiefly with respect to a "universal hermeneutics," the
second Part reviews some of Habermas's critical rejoinders and
initiatives aiming basically at a parcelling of forms of human
knowledge. In the concluding Part, an effort is made to highlight the
significance of the debate for the ongoing process of globalization and
the possibility of a "dialogue of civilizations."
1. See EDMUND HUSSERL, LOGISHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN (1900-01) (two volumes).
2. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 32-33 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962) (1927).
3. For some discussions of the debate, see Dieter Misgeld, Critical Theory and
Hermeneutics: The Debate Between Habermas and Gadamer, in ON CRITICAL THEORY 164,
164-83 (John O'Neill ed., 1976); PAUL RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, in
HERMENEUTICS

AND THE HUMAN

SCIENCES: ESSAYS

ON

LANGUAGE,

ACTION

AND

INTERPRETATION 63, 63-100 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., 1981); see also FRED R.
DALLMAYR, Life-World and Critique, in BETWEEN FREIBURG AND FRANKFURT: TOWARD A
CRITICAL ONTOLOGY 13, 13-24 (1991).
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GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS

As is well known, Gadamer's Truth and Method sought to
differentiate hermeneutics from a mere method or methodology-a
method which necessarily distances the knower from the known,
while specifying
a path for the "subject" to grasp or come to know its
"object. ' 4 This concern with methodology was still prevalent in
earlier forms of hermeneutics, including the "historicist" version of
Wilhelm Dilthey who construed hermeneutical understanding after
the model of a psychic-mental transfer whereby the interpreter would
gain access to intended meaning-structures of the past. By following
this path, the interpreter, in Dilthey's view, would gain "objective"
knowledge of historical meanings-an objectivity paralleling (though
radically different in kind from) the objectivity achieved in natural
science. This narrowly methodological preoccupation was thrown
into disarray by Heidegger's Being and Time, which insisted that
interpreter and past meanings are both embroiled in an underlying
temporal happening and that "understanding" is a basic feature of
human existence as such (undercutting the distinction between
human and natural sciences).,
With this insistence, Heidegger
jeopardized and eroded the centrality of the Cartesian ego cogitans
(as well as Kant's and Husserl's "transcendental consciousness")
together with its radical demarcations from "external" nature, world,
and fellow-beings.
As Gadamer comments, by renewing the
"question of being" and by construing being as temporal, Heidegger
"burst asunder the whole subjectivism of modern philosophy-and, in
fact, as was soon to appear, the whole horizon of questions asked by
metaphysics, which tended to define being as what is [objectively]
present."'6 By moving in this direction and by inaugurating a
"hermeneutics of facticity," Heidegger "went beyond both the
concept of mind developed by classical idealism and the thematic of
transcendental consciousness purified by phenomenological
reduction.

'

4. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 9-19 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
5. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 2, at 385-423.
6. GADAMER, supra note 4, at 257.
7. Id. at 258. As Gadamer adds, understanding for Heidegger
is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age of the spirit, as with
Dilthey; nor is it, as with Husserl, a last methodological ideal of philosophy in contrast
to the naivete of unreflecting life; it is, on the contrary, the original form of the
realizationof Dasein, which is being-in-the-world.
Id. at 259.
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Given Dasein's embroilment in the world (as a temporal
happening), understanding and interpreting cannot be a neutral
method starting from scratch, but only an ongoing process of reinterpreting. Differently phrased: understanding always presupposes
a pre-understanding before proceeding to a critique of meaning. This
is the sense of the so-called "hermeneutical circle," which, as
Gadamer observes, is not a vicious but a productive circle, an
inevitable precondition of understanding as such. 8 To centerstage this
circle, of course, does not equal an endorsement of arbitrary fancies
or subjective constructions-which would mean a relapse into the
problems of methodology.
Rather, like human Dasein itself,
understanding is a temporal process, involving an ongoing testing of
pre-understandings against the demands of texts or historical events,
that is, a dialogical-dialectical interchange between interpreter and
interpretandum. In Gadmer's words: "All [genuine] interpretation
must be on guard against arbitrary [whims] and the limitations
imposed by imperceptible habits of thought"; for this purpose, "it
must direct its gaze '[to] the things themselves"' (in Husserl's
formulation) and must steadfastly remain attentive to the thing or
topic (Sache) "throughout all the.., distractions [to which
interpreters are prone to be subject]."9

Seen from this angle,

hermeneutics is not a mode of psychological empathy, nor is it a
branch of subjective idealism; rather, it is part of Dasein's basic world
involvement, of its radical openness or exposure to transformative
learning experiences. As Gadamer adds: "[Anyone] trying to
understand is exposed to distraction from [pre-understandings or]
fore-meanings [Vor-Meinungen] that are not borne out by the things
themselves." 1° Working out interpretive possibilities in order to have
them

"confirmed

'by

the

things' ... is

the

constant

task

of

understanding": There is no other "'objectivity' here [but] the
confirmation of... fore-meaning[s through the labor of 'working
through' (Ausarbeitung)]."11
As one should note, "fore-meanings" or prejudgments in
Gadamer's view can be modified and corrected, but never completely
erased or eliminated (through a return to some kind of blank slate or
tabula rasa). This is the gist of his much-discussed rehabilitation of

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 266-67 (trans. slightly altered as indicated).
Id. at 267 (trans. altered as indicated).
Id. (trans. altered as indicated).
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"prejudice" (in the sense of prejudgment)12 and his critique of the
radical "prejudice against prejudices" characterizing modern
Enlightenment. 3 For proponents of modern Enlightenment, reason
is radically self-constituting and self-legitimating in that it grants
legitimacy to nothing outside its jurisdiction. All un-enlightened
assumptions -including religious beliefs and cultural traditions-are
basically suspect and discredited: they must either pass through the
filter of reason, and hence become "rationalized," or else will be
discarded as spurious or obsolete. By adopting this stance, rationalist
Enlightenment reconfirms the stark. demarcations of Cartesian
philosophy: whatever exceeds the confines of the sovereign cogito
must either be appropriated/assimilated, or else be excluded and
controlled.
What is missed in this approach is the possibility of a genuine
learning experience through reason's exposure to what is unfamiliar
or alien- including its own (prerational) prejudgments. To reopen
this possibility was precisely the point of Heidegger's Being and Time
with its emphasis on human finitude and the insertion of Dasein in
world and temporal happenings (antedating rational constitution).
From Heidegger's angle, Gadamer comments, reason is "not its own
master but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances
in which it operates"; prominent among these circumstances is
Dasein's "alien-ness" (Fremdheit) to itself.14 Seen in this light, he
adds sharply, self-reflection (in the sense of rational self-constitution)
is
not primary and [thus] not an adequate basis for [hermeneutics],
because through [it] history is [internalized or privatized] once
more. [But i]n fact[,] history does not belong to us; we belong to
it.... The focus of subjectivity [cogito] is a distorting mirror. The
self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the... circuits
of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far
more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his

being.5
Given Dasein's insertion in temporality, the rehabilitation of

12. Id. at 277-307.
13. Id. at 271-77.
14. Id. at 276.
15. Id. at 276-77 (translation slightly altered as indicated). Despite these sharp comments,
one cannot deny that Gadamer sometimes blunts the edge of his argument by resorting to very
conventional vocabulary (such as "historical consciousness" or "historically effective
consciousness") and by substituting often very "ontic" description for Heidegger's ontological
account. On some of these points, see FRED R. DALLMAYR, Hermeneuticsand Deconstruction:
Gadamer and Derrida in Dialogue, in CRITICAL ENCOUNTERS: BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND
POLITCS 130, 130-58 (1987).
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prejudgments is closely linked with a valorization of "tradition" and
of a certain "authority" exerted by texts or injunctions antedating
reason's self-constitution.16 In adopting this approach-it is important
to stress the point-Gadamer does not counsel a leap from autonomy
into unfreedom, from reason into irrationalism.
Basically, his
hermeneutics seeks to undercut or problematize the rigid bifurcation
between reason/freedom, on the one hand, and authority/tradition, on
the other. As he notes, only from the vantage of an abstract
rationalism could the notion of authority "be viewed as diametrically
opposed to reason and freedom" and be equated with "blind
obedience."17
In actuality, genuine authority for Gadamer is
predicated not on a simple "abdication" of reason but rather on "an
act of acknowledgement and knowledge": namely, on the uncoerced
recognition that the views of a text or teacher can rightly lay a claim
to our attention and hence deserve to be pondered carefully and
seriously.18
The same considerations apply to the role of tradition.19 In view
of Dasein's temporality, human relationship to the past for Gadamer
is not characterized by a mode of radical "distancing and freeing
ourselves from tradition"; differently phrased: Dasein's historical
situatedness does not imply an "objectifying process" of detached
analysis but rather reflects the fact that tradition "addresses" Dasein,
which in turn "lets itself be addressed by tradition. ' 2 Contrary to
certain Enlightenment teachings, human "maturity" (Miindigkeit)
does not signify a total self-mastery in the sense of a radical
"liberation from all tradition." Here, again, one has to resist binary
construals. Genuine tradition, for Gadamer, is not the "dead hand"
of the past but a lived experience that involves "always an element of
freedom"; as a process of transmission, preservation, and renewal, it
implies "an act of reason, though an inconspicuous one. ' 21 Once this
is admitted, the "abstract antithesis" between tradition and historical
knowledge needs to be discarded; the "effect (Wirkung) of a living
tradition" and its reflective transmission must be seen as a dialectical
continuity.22
GADAMER, supra note 4, at 277-82.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 279-80.
See id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id. at281.
Id. at 282 (emphasis omitted). Regarding the rehabilitation of "authority," compare
also HANNAH ARENDT, What Is Authority?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: Six EXERCISES

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Here a central feature of Gadamerian hermeneutics comes into
view: the dialogical-dialectical character of understanding and its
embeddedness in an "effective" or effectively operative history
(Wirkungsgeschichte).3 Hermeneutical understanding, in his account,
does not mean an act of psychic empathy (a transposition of ego into
alter), nor an act of assimilation (of alter and ego), but rather a
process of reciprocal questioning at the intersection between self and
other, between familiarity and strangeness (Fremdheit). Hermeneutics, hence, is basically marked by tension: for example, the
tension between a traditional text's distance or strangeness and its
familiarity as part of a tradition: "The true locus of hermeneutics is
this in-between. '24 This locus is also important for the role of
prejudgments, namely by sorting out productive from unwarranted or
misleading prejudices. In being open to strangeness or unfamiliarity,
hermeneutical understanding allows itself to be addressed and to be
called into "question"-which is "the first condition of hermeneutics. '25 The same condition implies a questioning of initial,
perhaps misleading "fore-meanings" and their replacement by more
productive judgments-which in turn become resources for continued
questioning or inquiry. In Gadamer's words: "The essence of the
question is to open up possibilities and keep them open.... [O]ur26
own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk.
Throughout this reciprocal questioning historical temporality
manifests its effectiveness (Wirkung) by framing or structuring the
interchange, mainly by disclosing "the right questions to ask."27 The

same historical effectiveness also prevents closure or the final
termination of questioning. Here a Hegelian motif comes into play
(though without recourse to "absoluteness"). As Gadamer notes, the
task of philosophical hermeneutics might be described as the effort
"to retrace the path of Hegel's phenomenology of mind until we
discover in all that is subjective the substantiality [Substanzialitat]that
determines it." 8
IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 91-141 (1961); especially her comment that "[a]uthority implies an

obedience in which men retain their freedom." Id. at 106.
23. See GADAMER, supra note 4, at 295-307.
24. Id. at 295 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id. at 299.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 301.
28. Id. at 302. Elaborating on this point Gadamer adds: "All self-knowledge arises from
what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call 'substance,' because it underlies all
subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for
understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity [Andersheit]." Id.
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Observations of this kind clearly underscore a main point of
Truth and Method: that hermeneutics is not merely a limited
methodology, tailored to specialized modes of inquiry, but rather a
general philosophical perspective relevant to the broad range of
human experience (in both its theoretical and practical dimensions).
Given its extensive scope, hermeneutics can properly be described as
"universal" -although it is important to note the peculiar character of
its universality. As a participant in ongoing human experience,
hermeneutical understanding cannot claim the status of an abstract
"meta-theory," of a universal framework or schema under which
particular events or phenomena can be subsumed. In an emphatic
manner, such a status is asserted by (variants of) modern philosophy
of science, particularly by the project of a "unified science" providing
a comprehensive explanation of all aspects of reality; in modified
form, a similar ambition prevails in Kantian and neo-Kantian types of
rationalism as well as in versions of structural social analysis. In
contrast to these schemas, hermeneutics has to pursue a more
subdued, and partially inductive, path; shunning meta-vistas, universalism in this case can only mean a particular openness and
responsiveness: an openness to the diverse horizons "addressing" or
impinging on human understanding. This reticent kind of universalism was carefully elucidated by Gadamer in the decade following
Truth and Method. His essay The Universality of the Hermeneutical

Problem29 (1966) pointedly invokes the Aristotelian model of
inductive generalization (as discussed in Posterior Analytics). To
illustrate the emergence of the general out of particulars, Aristotle
used the example of a fleeing and dispersed army that somehow,
without unified superior command, comes to a halt and takes a stand
again. "How," Gadamer queries,
does one arrive at a universal?... How does it happen that...
"words"

..

. have a general meaning? .. .When is the principle

present as a principle? Through what capacity? This question is in
fact the question of the occurrence of the universal.30
In Gadamer's account, this "occurrence of the universal" stands
in contrast to the stylized theories and meta-theories that, in the
modern context, oppose a detached spectator to an increasingly
objectified universe. This spectatorial detachment is manifest in
modern aesthetics where art and the arena of artistic experience tend
29. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem (1966), in
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 3 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976).
30. Id. at 14.
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to be "alienated into an object of aesthetic judgment" or taste.31 A
similar detachment or alienation operates in modern historiography,
which tries to offer an objective account of all historical data, perhaps
even a meta-theory linking these data in an explanatory framework.
Reduced to methodology, even hermeneutics sometimes parades as a
neutral "science" of understanding in which substantive contents are
alienated into objective targets of analysis. In opposition to these
theoretical and meta-theoretical pretensions, Gadamer invokes the
notion of "hermeneutical experience," which-far from being a
synonym for subjective egocentrism-points to the open-ended or
"horizonal" character of human understanding. Replicating themes
from Truth and Method, his essay insists on the "secondary" status of
aesthetic judgment vis-A-vis the "immediate truth-claim" of art, that
is, the challenge or address issuing from the artwork itself. As he
writes, in a near-poetic vein, "our sensitive-spiritual existence is an
aesthetic resonance chamber that resonates with the voices that are
32
constantly reaching us, preceding all explicit aesthetic judgment.
History is a similar resonance chamber, in that the past is always
illuminated by present and future hopes, showing (in Heidegger's
terms) "the primacy of futurity for our possible recollection and
retention."33 In these and other ways, hermeneutical experience
reveals itself not as a closed circuit, but as a gateway opening up to
new visions, including dimensions of alterity (Fremdheit): "The nature
of the hermeneutical experience is not that something is outside and
desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and
precisely by means of it we are opened up for the new, the different,
'34
the true.
In Gadamer's presentation, hermeneutical experience denotes a
primary mode of embeddedness (prior to theoretization), a mode that
is preeminently displayed in language as the matrix of human beingin-the-world (or, with Heidegger, as the "house of Being"). As he
states forcefully: "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of
our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution
of the world" (which is not a subjective-intentional production). 5
Along the same lines, he speaks of the "linguistic constitution of the
world," adding that "[ilt presents itself as the consciousness that is
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

4.
8.
9.
3.
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effected by history [wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein] and that
provides an initial schematization for all our possibilities of
knowing. 3 6 What is important to note here is that, just like
experience, language for Gadamer is not a prison-house but again a
gateway to infinite explorations. "While we live wholly within a
language," he emphasizes, "the fact that we do so does not constitute
linguistic relativism because there is absolutely no captivity within a
language-not even within our native language." 7 The latter aspect
is demonstrated by our ability to learn foreign languages and by the
experience on distant journeys when we manage to "master [a]
foreign language to some extent."38 What Gadamer opposes here is
the axiom of the "incommensurability" of language games-an axiom
fashionable in some skeptical and/or deconstructive quarters and
often associated with the claim of radical cultural relativism. The
axiom is clearly incompatible with hermeneutics, which steers a
difficult course between abstract (meta-theoretical) universalism and
a debilitating particularism. Here is an eloquent passage that
deserves to be lifted up:
Any language in which we live is infinite in this sense [of opening
up vistas], and it is completely mistaken to infer that reason is
fragmented because there are various languages. Just the opposite
is the case. Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of our
being, which is evident even in the variety of languages, the39infinite
dialogue is opened in the direction of the truth that we are.
The crucial and even primordial character of language for human
being-in-the-world was examined roughly at the same time in another
essay titled Man and Language (1966).40 In this context Gadamer
notes first of all a certain "lag" of philosophical reflection: the fact
that Western philosophy traditionally has not placed language at the
center of its considerations. This situation changed only slowly
during the Enlightenment period when Herder and von Humboldt
began to construe human "nature" as basically linguistic; however,
even then that nature tended to be seen largely in terms of
"consciousness" and subjectivity. Only more recently has the depth36. Id. at 13.
37. Id. at 15-16.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. The last sentence points to a complex notion of "truth," transgressing correspondence or adequation in the direction of an ontological mode of disclosure or aletheia.
Compare in this respect HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Was 1st Wahrheit?, in 1 KLEINE SCHRIFTEN:
PHILOSOPHIE, HERMENEUTIK 46, 46-58 (J.C.B. Mohr 1967).
40. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Man and Language (1966), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 29, at 59.
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quality of language come into view. "For it is part of the nature of
language," Gadamer states, "that it has a completely unfathomable
unconsciousness of itself. ' 41 This means that-rather than being
merely a handy tool or utensil-language challenges and addresses us
in complex ways. Although we can "theorize" about language, raising
it to an object of scientific analysis, the problem is that "we can never
really do this completely. ' 42 For, "all thinking about language is
already once again drawn back into language"; and "this residing of
our thinking in a language is" precisely "the profound enigma that
language presents to thought. '43 In his essay, Gadamer highlights
three main features of language that are crucial for hermeneutics.
The first feature is the "essential self-forgetfulness" of language in
that the focal concerns of linguistic science-such as grammar and
syntax-are not at all "conscious to living speaking.""4 The second
aspect is the basic "I-lessness" or non-egocentric character of
language, the fact that language comes to life in dialogue-which, in
turn, is not just an intentionally controlled exchange but rather
exhibits the quality of a "play" (Spiel).41 For, when participants are
carried along by dialogue, it is no longer their will or intention that is
governing but rather the topic (Sache) itself that "plays them into
each other." 46 The last feature is the "universality of language,"
which "is not a delimited realm" of discourse or "of the speakable,
over against which other realms [that are] unspeakable might
stand. '47 Like hermeneutical experience, language and dialogical
saying have "an inner infinity and no end."
II.

HABERMAS'S CRITICAL REJOINDERS

As articulated in these and related writings, Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics clearly signaled a broad-scale attack on
the "unified science" program (promoted by logical positivism); in
doing so, it also mounted a challenge to the self-conception of the
social sciences that, during this period, were increasingly coming
41. Id. at 62.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 64.
45. Id. at 65-66.
46. Id. at 66.
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id. In stressing the speakable, Gadamer does not question the correlation of the "said"
and "unsaid": "Nothing that is said has its truth simply in itself, but refers instead backward and
forward to what is unsaid." Id.
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under the sway of positivist or narrowly empiricist paradigms. In a
nuanced and carefully calibrated way, the latter challenge was taken
up by JUrgen Habermas whose dual role as philosopher and
sociologist nearly predestined him to the task. Barely a year after
Man and Language, Habermas published an extensive review of
Gadamer's Truth and Method, a review which moved from an initial
endorsement of key Gadamerian insights through a crescendo of
reservations to the formulation of a critical counter-model along
social-scientific (or social-theoretical) lines. 49 Among the positive
elements of Gadamer's perspective, the review focused first of all on
the role of language or "linguisticality" (Sprachlichkeit) seen as the
shared matrix of understanding. In order to break through the
barriers of particular grammars, Habermas noted, it was not
necessary to abscond into the kind of meta-language favored by
structural linguistics (and logical empiricism). Rather, to preserve the
"unity of reason" in the multiplicity of languages, ordinary language
itself furnishes the needed resources, in the sense that "every
ordinary... grammar [provides] the possibility to transcend the
language it determines, that is, to translate from and into other
languages."50 Following Gadamer it was hence legitimate to say that
"we are never locked within a single grammar" and that the idea of a
"monadology" of language games was illusory.5 In opposition to this
mistaken idea, it was important to affirm (with Gadamer) that the
first grammar we learn to master already puts us in a position "to step
out of it and to interpret what is foreign, to make comprehensible
what initially is incomprehensible, to assimilate in our own words
'5 2
what at first escapes them.
Habermas in this context explicitly referred to Hegel's "dialectic
of the limit" -where "limit" denotes both boundary and linkage.5 3 As
he observed, this ambivalence of "limit" was adequately captured in
Gadamer's hermeneutics and especially in the notion of "hermeneutic
experience" seen as the corrective through which reason, though
49. Juirgen Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING
AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335 (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977) [hereinafter
Habermas, Review]. The review was first published in German in PhilosophischeRundschau in
1967, and was subsequently incorporated into JORGEN HABERMAS, ZUR LOGIK DER
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN 251-90 (Suhrkamp 1970). For an English version of the latter study,
see JURGEN HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Shierry Weber Nicholsen
& Jerry A. Stark trans., MIT Press 1988) (1970).
50. Habermas, Review, supra note 49, at 335.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 336.
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language-based, escapes the "spell" (or prison-house) of a given
Wedded to the task of translation, hermeneutics
grammar.14
appropriately mistrusts any relinquishment or "mediatizing" of
ordinary language; refusing the exit route into meta-language, it
makes use instead of the "tendency to self-transcendence" embedded
in ordinary linguistic practices.5 Hence, without denying its linguistic
"incarnation," reason can also cleanse itself of the "dross" of a
linguistic particularity-namely, by "passing over into another"
(through translation).16 At this point, the Hegelian idea of "limit"
shades over into the hermeneutical notion of "horizon," which is
In Habermas's words:
always open-ended and transgressive.
"Horizons are open, and they shift; we enter into them and they in
turn move with us."57 Contrary to Wittgenstein's "monadological"
conception, ordinary languages are not tightly closed circuits but
rather open-ended life-forms endowed with a "horizonal" quality
linking them with what is other or alien (Fremdheit)18 Reiterating
central Gadamerian teachings, the review stated:
[Piroper to the grammar of a language game [is] not only that it
defines a form of life but that it defines a form of life as one's own
over against others that are foreign. Because every word that is
articulated in a language is a totality, the horizon of a language also
encompasses that which it is not-it discloses itself as particular
among particulars. For this reason, the limits of the world that it
defines are not irrevocable; the dialectical confrontation of what is
foreign leads, for the most part
one's own with what is
imperceptibly, to revisions.5 9
In Habermas's account, the horizonal quality is operative not
only laterally between different language communities, but also
In this
temporally between generations and historical epochs.
connection, "horizon" refers to the complex interlacing of
temporalities, and translation shades over into the notion of
"tradition" (Uberlieferung). In contrast to reductive learning models,
learning a language does not merely involve a rigid process of
socialization but also an initiation into the interpretation and even

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 339.
58. Id.
59. Id. As Habermas adds: "Gadamer uses the image of a horizon to capture the basic
hermeneutic character of every concrete language-far from having a closed boundary, each
concrete language can in principle incorporate what is linguistically foreign and at first
incomprehensible." Id. at 342.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:825

creative transformation of linguistic rules-rules which are designed
"to overcome, [but] thereby also to express, distance. '60 Seen from
this angle, interpretation is a mode of "application"-but with a
difference; in Gadamerian terms, language performance implies an
application of linguistic rules, which, in turn, "further develops [these]
rules historically. '' 61 Differently phrased: language application is a
practical act or a form of participatory praxis-which stands in sharp
opposition to the meta-stance of an external observer and also to the
mere implementation of technical rules or formulas. In Habermas's
words, technical rules are "abstractly general" and can be compared
to theoretical statements "whose conditions of application are
expressed in general terms"; in this case, it is possible to "subsume
cases under something abstractly general. ' 62 The situation is different
with practical, including linguistic, rules. For here, generality shapes
the particular "only to the degree to which it is itself first concretized
by this particular"; only in this manner does the general gain
"intersubjective recognition. '63 The Review acknowledges at this
point the connection between Gadamerian hermeneutics and
Aristotelian teachings, especially Aristotle's notions of praxis and
practical (ethical-political) knowledge (phronesis).
For both
Gadamer and Aristotle, we read, language performance and related
activities "are components of the same form of life (bios)"; and the
latter is always "a social form of life that is developed through
communicative action." 64
In elaborating on the participatory aspect of language, Habermas
also comments on the difference between hermeneutics and
"objective" or objectifying methodologies-including the methods
(previously discussed) of "aesthetic consciousness" and "historical (or
historicist) consciousness." Regarding the latter, he focuses first of all
on historicist versions of hermeneutics as championed by
Schleiermacher and Dilthey-whom he charges with "aestheticizing... history" while "anaesthetizing... historical reflection. ' 65
Against this defect, he notes, "Gadamer brings to bear, subtly [but]
relentlessly, Hegel's insight that the restitution of past life is possible
only to the extent that it is a reconstruction of the present out of its
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

339.
340.
354.
353.
344.
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past." 66 A similar defect afflicts phenomenological and linguistic
approaches in sociology-which tend to "move to the side of
historicism"; unwilling to embrace hermeneutical insights, they
"succumb to objectivism, since they claim for the phenomenological
observer and the language analyst a purely theoretical [spectatorial]
attitude. '67 In this respect, "Gadamer's first-rate critique of the
objectivistic self-understanding of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)" appears right on target. 68 In a more circuitous way, the
same critique also applies to Arthur Danto's construal of
historiography in terms of narrative or narratology. 69 According to
Habermas, Danto was quite correct in debunking the concept of an
"ideal chronicler" who would be able to describe historical events by
using a "temporally neutral observation language"; for such a
language would exclude the very "interpretation that alone makes it
possible to comprehend an observed event as an historical event."70
What vitiated Danto's approach, however, was his attempt to exclude
the interpreter's practical engagements from his historical narrative.
From an hermeneutical angle, the historian's work is only "the last
rung on a ladder of interpretations" whose first rung is the reference
system of the historian who, in principle, "cannot be independent of
his horizon of expectations."7 1 More sharply phrased: the historian
cannot grasp anything that he or she knows of history "independently
of the framework of his own life-practice (Lebenspraxis)."72
In light of this sensitive and appreciative reading of Gadamer's
work, the Review's conclusion is bound to come as a surprise.
Although preceded by reservations cautiously inserted into the
exegesis, the concluding argument somewhat abruptly shifts gears in
the direction of a more social-scientific (and objectifying) mode of
analysis. Without directly abandoning hermeneutics, Habermas
decides to restrict its scope to a compartmentalized domain among
others-a division accomplished no longer under hermeneuticalparticipatory but under theoretical (or meta-theoretical) auspices.73
As a result, the fluidly open-ended or "horizonal" quality of
66.
67.
68.
69.
(1965).
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The reference is to

ARTHUR C. DANTO,

Habermas, Review, supra note 49, at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 350.
See id. at 354-56.
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hermeneutics gives way to theoretically stipulated forms of inquiry; as
a corollary, the Hegelian "dialectic of the limit" makes room for
delimiting boundaries (more along Kantian lines). Despite an
admission that hermeneutics cannot be assigned one-sidedly "either
to theory or to experience," the Review finds in Gadamer's work a
deficit of rational theory-a topic which Hegel could address "with
greater legitimacy. '74 Despite the earlier recognition of the role of
distance and strangeness (Fremdheit) in hermeneutics, Habermas now
stresses a more rigorous or disciplined type of exodus or alienation:
"A controlled distanciation (Verfremdung) can raise understanding
from prescientific experience to the rank of a reflective procedure"'
which is the way in which its insights "enter into the social sciences."75
The defensible critique of spectatorial objectivism, from this angle,
cannot justify the suspension of that "methodological distanciation of
the object," which is the hallmark of science. 76 At this point, the
accents of Gadamer's title are resolutely shifted from "truth" to
"method," making the former in large part a derivative result of the
latter. In Habermas's words: "The confrontation of 'truth' and
'method' should not have misled Gadamer to oppose hermeneutic
experience abstractly to methodic knowledge. 7 7 The legitimate
resistance to positivist scientism, in any event, "brings no dispensation
7' 8
from the business of methodology in general.
The defense of method (vis-A-vis "truth") is paralleled in the
Review by the vindication of reason over "prejudice" and of
emancipatory freedom over "tradition." In Habermas's account, the
rational appropriation of the past "breaks up the nature-like
(naturwiichsige) substance of tradition and alters the position of the
subject in it. 1 79 In modernity, this breaking-up has been powerfully
promoted by science and scientific reflection through which the fabric
of tradition has been "profoundly altered."
These and related
developments have shifted the balance between tradition and reason
and also between authority and reason-something Gadamer fails to
see because he does not "appreciate the power of reflection that is
developed in understanding" and that "shakes the dogmatism of life74. Id. at 354-55.
75. Id. at 355.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 356.
7M Id. In this context, Habermas targets the influence of Heidegger, especially Heideggerian "ontology," as responsible for Gadamer's privileging of "truth" over "method." See id.
79. Id.

2000]

BORDERS OR HORIZONS? GADAMER AND HABERMAS REVISITED

841

practices."80 Bypassing the nuanced distinction between tenable and
untenable "prejudgments," Habermas now charges Gadamer with an
incipient anti-rationalism and with the "rehabilitation of prejudice as
such" - adding that "Gadamer is motivated by the conservatism of
that first generation, by the impulse of a Burke that has not yet [fully]
turned against the rationalism of the eighteenth century."8 1 Countering questions or critical queries addressed at the Enlightenment
"project," Habermas in this context champions rational self-reflection
as the gateway to complete rational transparency and hence also to
human freedom or emancipation. Reason or reflection, in his
account, acts as a kind of solvent or detergent cleansing the "dross" of
the past; once exposed to this solvent, pre-understanding "can no
longer function as a prejudice. ' 82 As Habermas adds, celebrating the
legacy of Kant and Fichte:
Gadamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudices certified by
tradition denies the power of reflection. The latter proves itself,
however, in being able to reject the claim of tradition. Reflection
dissolves substantiality because it not only confirms, but also breaks
up, dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge....
This experience of reflection is the unforgettable legacy
bequeathed to us 83by German Idealism from the spirit of the
eighteenth century.
As one should note, Habermas's celebration here does not cover
idealist reflection in toto, but only a kind of formal or meta-reflection
(minus Hegel's "objective" and "absolute spirit"). Parcelled off from
the domain of pre-reflective experience, this meta-reflection in turn
allows the parcelling out or compartmentalization of domains of
methodological knowledge or inquiry. As Habermas observes,
reflection today "can no longer comprehend itself as absolute spirit";
in the wake of the "linguistic turn," language has come to function as
a sort of limited or "contingent absolute." 84 Hence, Hegel's notion of
experience contracts into the awareness of "a happening in which the85
conditions of rationality change" depending on types of inquiry.
Seen from this angle, hermeneutical understanding no longer exhibits
the "horizonal" quality claimed by Gadamer and must content itself
with a more restricted scope. For Habermas, Gadamer's approach is
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id.

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:825

"not objective enough" because it does not recognize the external
forces impinging on understanding, that is, the "walls" or
"boundaries" against which it comes up "from the inside. '86 Despite
its status as a social matrix, language is "evidently dependent" also on
objectively analyzable social processes: most prominently the
processes of labor and domination. By "social labor" Habermas
means a broad spectrum of activities ranging from economic
production to the instrumental designs of science and technology,
activities ultimately rooted in the "anthropologically deep-seated
vantage point of technical mastery. 8 7 A similar impact is wielded by
social power and domination, which distort language into ideological
manipulation. As the Review concludes, the linguistic matrix of
"society is part of a complex that ... is also constituted by the
constraint of reality": more specifically "by the constraint of outer
nature that enters into procedures for technical mastery" and "the
constraint of inner nature reflected in the repressive character of
social power relations." 88 Operating "behind the back of language,"
these forces reveal society as an "objective framework that is
8' 9
constituted conjointly by language, labor, and domination.
Although startling in the context of the Review, Habermas's
concluding arguments could not come as a complete surprise to
readers of his own evolving opus, which, precisely at that time, was
revolving around the problem of types of knowledge and their
"constitution" in pre-reflective experience. Already two years prior
to the Review, Habermas had presented his inaugural lecture in
Frankfurt on the topic "Knowledge and Human Interests" - an
address that, in lapidary style, contained the main seminal ideals
subsequently elaborated in book form (under the same title). 9°
Although richly nuanced and replete with complex historical
allusions, the address advanced mainly two points: first, the need to
reconnect knowledge or reason with pre-reflective experience; and
secondly, the importance of compartmentalizing modes of knowledge

86.
87.
8&
89.
90.

Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
JURGEN HABERMAS, Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective, in
KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, 301, 308, 313-14 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon
Press, 1971) (1968) [hereinafter HABERMAS, Knowledge]. For the German text of the lecture
"Erkenntnis und Interesse," see JURGEN HABERMAS, TECHNIK UND WISSENSCHAFT ALS
"IDEOLOGIE" 146-68 (Suhrkamp 1968). The book Erkenntnis und Interesse was first published
in 1968, also by Suhrkamp.
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in three rubrics. Both points were basically meant as corrective
antidotes to positivism. According to Habermas, one of positivism's
misleading claims was the neutral detachment of science from lifecontexts. Partly following in Husserl's footsteps, his address sought to
uncover a deep-seated or "quasi-transcendental" framework of
human reason: the framework of cognitive or "knowledgeconstitutive interests." 91 As he wrote, for three categories of inquiry
one can demonstrate "a specific connection between logicalmethodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests"- a
demonstration that is the task of a "critical philosophy of science
escaping the snares of positivism. ' 92 The other corrective to positivist
scientism was the compartmentalization of knowledge into three
domains: the "empirical-analytical sciences," the "historicalhermeneutic sciences," and the critique of ideology (governed
respectively by a "technical," a "practical," and an "emancipatory"
interest). 93 Among the three types, the highest form of rational
transparency was provided by self-reflection operative in ideology
critique. In the words of the lecture:
The specific viewpoints from which, with transcendental
necessity, we apprehend reality ground three categories of possible
knowledge: information that expands our power of technical
control; interpretations that make possible the orientation of action
within common traditions; and analyses that free consciousness
from its dependence on hypostatized powers. These viewpoints
originate in the interest structure of a species that is linked in its
roots to definite means of social organization: work, language, and
power ....
... The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of
reflection as such.... [T]hus that in the power of self-reflection,
knowledge and interestare one.94

III.

CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HABERMAS-GADAMER

DEBATE
This is not the occasion to recapitulate in detail the debate that
ensued from Habermas's theoretical intervention. Here it must
suffice to highlight some salient points and broader implications.
Basically, the texts reviewed above pinpointed a contrast of
91.
92.
93.
94.

HABERMAS, Knowledge, supra note 90, at 307-08, 313-14.

Id. at 308.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 313-14.
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philosophical positions, a kind of parting of ways that subsequent
discussions and elaborations only managed to reinforce (despite
occasional accommodations); in a sense, they laid the groundwork for
sharply divergent trajectories only partially mitigated by a shared
commitment to dialogue or communication. For his part, Gadamer
immediately recognized the challenge and promptly responded in a
series of essays. A major point taken up in his response was the issue
of the "horizonal" (or universalizing) quality of hermeneutics, as
opposed to its narrow, "methodical" compartmentalization. 9 As
Gadamer reiterated, hermeneutical understanding is not a confined
mode of inquiry, but rather a distinctive mark of human "being-inthe-world" in all its dimensions. His own "philosophical hermeneutics" hence was not meant to inaugurate a special methodology,
but rather to thematize the pervasive significance of understanding in
all types or modalities of human experience. It is in this sense that
hermeneutics can properly lay claim to a universal (or horizonal)
scope because it discloses "the universality of human linguisticality as
a limitless medium that carries everything within it... because
everything (in the world and out of it) is included in the realm of
'understandings' and understandability in which we move. ' 96 The
term "everything" here includes even modern science because it is the
matrix of understandings (or pre-understandings) which generates the
questions addressed to science. 97
Given the scope of this matrix, Gadamer could not possibly
consent to Habermas's compartmentalizing strategy. One important
feature of this strategy was the separation of methodological inquiry
from pre-reflective understanding or-more broadly stated-of
reason from tradition (or life-world). As Gadamer noted, this
separation or division involved "a prior decision of greatest
significance": by extricating itself entirely from tradition, methodology removed itself very far from the customary ambience of human
understanding "with all its bridge building and recovery of the best in
the past. '98 As an antidote to this breach, his response advanced the
thesis-crucial both philosophically and socially-"that the thing
which hermeneutics teaches us is to see through the dogmatism of
asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural
95.
(1967),
96.
97.
98.

HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection
in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 29, at 18, 25-26.
Id. at 25.
See id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
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'tradition' and the reflective appropriation of it.""9 Gadamer at this
point brought this assertion in contact with the sort of positivist
objectivism that "critical theory" supposedly challenged. In his
words: "[B]ehind this assertion [of separation] stands a dogmatic
objectivism that distorts the very concept of hermeneutical reflection
itself.' 1° From the angle of this objectivism, understanding is
construed no longer "in relationship to the hermeneutical situation
and the constant operativeness of history [Wirkungsgeschichte]...,
but in such a way as to imply that [the observer] ... does not enter

into the [hermeneutical] event" (preferring instead the role of
spectator or the view from nowhere.101 Habermas's contention that
this retreat or distanciation was the necessary consequence of modern
science-or even the "priceless heritage of German idealism"neglected the human and social costs of the process. For: "What kind
of understanding does one achieve through 'controlled alienation'? Is
it not likely to be an alienated understanding" - and possibly no
understanding at all? 102
The latter comments were relevant particularly to the tripartition
of types of inquiry (as outlined in "Knowledge and Human
Interests").
For Gadamer, this partitioning rested on a basic
misconception of hermeneutics: namely, its misconstrual as a
narrowly cultural, mental, or "idealist" enterprise opposed to a "real"
world outside. 103 As Truth and Method repeatedly insisted, however,
self stands always in relation to non-self, the familiar in relation to the
alien or foreign (Fremdheit), in a manner undercutting inside/outside
binaries and also the bifurcation between understanding, on the one
hand, and labor and power, on the other. "[D]oes hermeneutics,"
Gadamer asks, "really take its bearings from a limiting concept of
perfect interaction between understood motives and consciously
performed action," or does it not also pertain to meanings that are
"not actually intended"?1°4 In the latter case, why should the socalled "real factors" (of labor and power) lie "outside the realm of
hermeneutics"?15
From the hermeneutical vantage properly
understood, he added, "it is absolutely absurd to regard the concrete
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
See id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
ld. at 31.
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factors of work and politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics."1l
Regarding the "critique of ideology" and especially the claimed
"coincidence" of reason and emancipatory interest, Gadamer chided
its triumphalist hyperbole, manifest in the absorption of interest into
reason and the resulting radical ascendancy of "enlightenment" over
traditional life-practices. In his pointed rejoinder:
I cannot accept the assertion that reason and authority[/tradition]
are abstract antitheses, as the emancipatory Enlightenment did....
... [I]n my opinion this abstract antithesis... is a mistake
fraught with ominous consequences. In it, reflection is granted a
false power, and the true dependencies involved are misjudged on
the basis of a fallacious idealism. 107
On Habermas's part, the rejoinder triggered a rethinking of some
disputed issues-but without jeopardizing the privilege accorded to
method (and meta-theory).
Among the points advanced by
Gadamer, Habermas accepted mainly the critique of the merger or
coincidence of reason and life-practice-a notion he jettisoned in
favor of further compartmentalization. As he admitted, the relation
between knowledge and interest had been too narrowly construed in
terms of "knowledge-constitution," a construal that needed to give
way to a sharper distinction between the origin or "genesis" of
knowledge claims and their general "validity." To mark this division,
the notion of rational "discourse" was now introduced to designate a
formalized mode of communication in which pre-reflective lifepractice is bracketed (or "virtualized") in order to permit rigorous
testing of arguments. Corresponding to the previous tripartition
(labor, interactive language, and critique of power), three types of
validity claims were specially highlighted: the claims to cognitive
"truth," moral "rightness," and personal "truthfulness." Still more
importantly, the notion of critical "self-reflection" was further
internalized or subjectified, thus making room for a more detached
and "objective" meta-reflection termed "rational reconstruction,"
which was designed to uncover anonymous rule mechanisms and
competences governing human thought and practices in general. 1°8 In
quick succession, the reconstructive model was applied both to the
genetic or "diachronic" development of human societies and to the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 33.
108. For some of these arguments, see Juirgen Habermas, A Postscript to Knowledge and
Human Interests, 3 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 157, 157-89 (1975); Jirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic
Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS
AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE 181, 181-211 (1980).
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"synchronic" analysis of rule systems underlying universal language
performance. Habermas's Legitimation Crisis °9 (1973) offered a
broad reconstructive sketch of social evolution, relying chiefly on the
twin engines of progressive social differentiation and rationalization.
Differentiation in this context signaled the growing separation
between formalized "system" and "life-world," where "system"
embraced the domains of the economy (labor) and the state (power),
while life-world denoted interactive processes (undergoing the steady
pull of rationalization). 10° In turn, the reconstruction of speech
performance led to the theory of a "universal pragmatics" (first
presented in 1976), a theory according to which speakers necessarily
relate to three different "worlds": the "objective world" of external
nature through "constative" speech acts, the "social (norm-regulated)
world" through "regulative". speech acts, and the "subjective world"
through "avowals" or "expressive" acts-while relying on language
itself as means or medium of communication.'
Habermas's penchant for border-drawing and compartmentalization was continued and even intensified in subsequent
writings-of which only brief glimpses can be offered here. His
magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action"2 (1981),
transferred the partitioning of "worlds" and speech acts to the
domain of action theory, a transfer that yielded the stipulation of four
main sociological concepts of action correlated with three basic types
of formal "worlds" (plus the life-world). As before, the latter
included the "objective world" defined as "the totality of states of
affairs that either obtain or could arise or could be brought about by
purposeful intervention"; the "social world" seen as "the totality of
legitimate interpersonal relations"; and the "subjective world" as "the
totality of subjective experiences to which the actor has, in relation to
others, a privileged access.""1 3 The corresponding types of action
were "teleological" (and/or "strategic") action involving relations
with external reality (and subject to the criteria of truth and/or
efficacy); "norm-regulated" action involving relations mainly with
society (criterion: rightness); and "dramaturgical" action pertaining
109. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1975) (1973).
110. Id. at 1-17.
111. JURGEN HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics?,in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1-68 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1979) (1976).
112. JUJRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy

trans., Beacon Press 1984 & 1987) (1981) (two volumes).
113. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 112, at 87-91.
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mainly to the expression of inner dispositions (criterion: truthfulness)."4 As a fourth type, "communicative" action was said to bring
into play the "linguistic medium" reflecting an "actor's relations to
the world as such.""' 5 More recently, similar forms of partitioning
have emerged in Habermas's moral, political, and legal theories. In
the field of political theory, in particular, his notion of "deliberative"
or "procedural" democracy maintains the early triad of labor,
interaction, and power-now under the system- (or meta-) theoretical
rubrics of economy, civil society, and public administration (or
"state"). As we read in Between Facts and Norms: The procedural
model of democracy "respects the boundaries between 'state' and
'society,' but it distinguishes civil society, as the social basis of
autonomous public spheres, from both the economic system and
public administration.""16 Accordingly, this model "requires a
realignment in the relative importance of the three resources from
which modern societies satisfy their needs for integration and
steering: money, administration, and [social] solidarity.""' 7
As can readily be seen in these and related writings, the contrast
marking the initial encounter was steadily deepened-with both
theoretical and practical consequences. Philosophically, Habermas's
evolving trajectory involved a progressive sidelining or marginalization of hermeneutics, its reduction to at best a subsidiary role in
the midst of complex, mutually delimited compartments. What was
lost in this reduction was basically the "horizonal" or border-crossing
quality of hermeneutics: the readiness of understanding to be
"addressed" and possibly be transformed by multiple domains of
experience, including the domain of the other or alien (Fremdheit).
This loss was particularly evident in the compartmentalization of
"worlds"-the segregation of three formal worlds juxtaposed to the
life-world-a segregation which undercut the key notion of human
"being-in-the-world," thereby jeopardizing the possibility of coherent
self-understanding (and perhaps the very meaning of Dasein itself).
In addition to its problematic effects on human "being," the same
partitioning carries significant implications for the "worldliness" of
human life: namely, by distancing "nature" into a radically external
114. Id.
115. Id. at 94.
116. JORGEN

HABERMAS,

BETWEEN

FACTS

AND

NORMS:

CONTRIBUTIONS

TO

A

DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 299 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996)
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reality amenable to technical mastery and control, or else to the
productive forces of modern industry (labor). Despite repeated
complaints about the modern ascendancy of "instrumental
rationality," Habermas's segregating strategy bars any hermeneutical
transition or border-crossing between human endeavors and nature
(especially when the latter is seen in the Greek sense of physis). To
this extent, his work is scarcely sensitive to contemporary ecological
concerns, especially to the urgent need to curb technological mastery
and industrial production for the sake of a more sustainable ecospace
for humanity. A similar reduction is manifest in the stylizing of
psychic life into a "subjective world" of self-expression, a move
curtailing pre-reflective moorings in favor of a progressively rational
self-transparency.118
In sidelining hermeneutics, Habermas's trajectory also steadily
weakened or eroded its linkage with praxis or practical philosophy in
Aristotle's sense-whose legacy, in modified form, was preserved and
continued in Gadamer's work. In this respect, Habermas's bracketing
of ordinary life-practices in favor of formalized discourses and
rational reconstructions was bound to exact a price. Compared with
formal validity claims and anonymous rule structures, concrete lifepractices were liable to slide into the backwaters of unexamined
traditions or, worse yet, into the cauldron of irrational impulses and
atavistic desires. The same peril inhered in Habermas's extensive
borrowing from sociological "system theory" with it spectatorial (or
meta-theoretical) biases. By acknowledging the need for "system
integration" and maintenance, this borrowing jeopardized the very
notion of a "legitimation crisis"-whose chances were liable to be
thwarted by superior system imperatives (geared to efficacy and
administrative control). In a particularly patent manner, the peril
persists in Habermas's recent legal and political theorizing, especially
in his model of deliberative democracy. Wedged between the
subsystems of "money" and "administration," practical "solidarity" in
118. Following Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas turned increasingly away from
Freudian psychoanalysis in the direction of developmental psychology, especially the model of
cognitive and moral development as articulated by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. See,
e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, Moral Development and Ego Identity, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 69-94; JORGEN HABERMAS, Lawrence Kohlberg
and Neo-Aristotelianism, in JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE

ETHICS 113-132 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., MIT Press 1994) (1991). In Habermas's normative
theory, hermeneutical ethics is precariously wedged between a "pragmatic" and a properly
"moral" use of practical reason; in the specific domain of "moral discourse," hermeneutical
judgment (phronesis) is allotted a subsidiary role in the field of "application." Id. at 5-6, 13-14,
37-38.
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the social life-world seems to have little room to unfold and thrive. In
fact, the extensive homage paid to economic, technical, and
bureaucratic expertise tends to undercut the significance of political
participation and practical engagement-thus corroborating the longstanding retreat or atrophy of the "public sphere" in modern politics.
At the very least, greater attention would have to be given in the
model to hermeneutical-political bridge building, especially to the
need to reintegrate expert knowledge into the ordinary language of
practical political life. 119
Closely linked with the retreat of praxis is the danger posed to
dialogue and communication-especially in our rapidly globalizing
age. What is urgently needed in this context is an open-ended,
"horizonal" dialogue supportive of inter-civilizational learning and
practical engagement. This prospect is thwarted both by a retreat
into narrow particularism and a leap into spectatorial meta-theory.
Although the dangers of the former are manifest, the drawbacks of
the latter are often ignored. As Gadamer insists, however, both
particularism and meta-theory are equally non-conducive to
hermeneutical learning. From the vantage of meta-theory -including
formal meta-communication -ordinary languages and life-practices
are prone to be distanced and objectified, only to be subsumed as
instances under universal categories. (Alternatively, life-practices are
stylized as separate "worlds" without mediating connections.) In
Gadamer's view, the leap into meta-theory has always been a
particularly Western or "Occidental" temptation, encouraging the
pretense of a "superior" standpoint. As opposed to concrete or
"effective reflection", he notes, objectifying meta-reflection has been
the hallmark of the "Occidental linguistic history" - a paradigm that
is now being globalized, thus establishing "the grounds for the
119. The importance of such reintegration was still stressed in some of Habermas's early
writings, especially JURGEN HABERMAS,TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST,

SCIENCE, AND POLITICS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press 1970) (1968); JURGEN
HABERMAS,THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO

A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & Frederick G. Lawrence trans., MIT
Press 1989). More recently, however, the integrative capacity of both language and philosophy
has been greatly curtailed, with language shrinking into a means or "medium" of
communication, and philosophy mainly into a "stand-in" for scientific-theoretical knowledge.
See in this respect JORGEN HABERMAS, Does Philosophy Still Have a Purpose? (1971), in
PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL PROFILES 1, 1-19 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1983)
(1981); JURGEN HABERMAS, Philosophy As Stand-In and Interpreter, in MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 1, 1-20 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber
Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983); see also FRED R. DALLMAYR, Habermas and
Rationality, in BETWEEN FREIBURG AND FRANKFURT: TOWARD A CRITICAL ONTOLOGY,

supra note 3, at 132, 132-59.
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planetary civilization of tomorrow.
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To counter the defects of this

paradigm, Gadamer persistently counsels the return to lived practices,
and especially the cultivation of engaged dialogue across borders or
boundaries. Only such cultivation can engender a genuine social
"solidarity"-the term understood, not in the sense of a constraining
or exclusivist communitarianism, but in that of a nurturing and
mutually liberating democratic engagement. To conclude with a
"vintage" Gadamerian passage:
And so, as a kind of answer to the question, What is practice? I
would like to summarize: Practice is conducting oneself and acting
in solidarity. Solidarity, however, is the decisive condition and
basis of all social reason. There is a saying of Heraclitus, the
"weeping" philosopher: The logos is common to all, but people
behave as121if each had a private reason. Does this have to remain
this way?

120. See GADAMER, supra note 95, at 35.
121. HANs-GEORG GADAMER, What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason, in
REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 69, 87 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981).

